

Top Secret

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday 3 January 1978

CG NIDC 78/001C

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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

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State Dept. review completed

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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, 3 January 1978.

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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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USSR: Additional Grain Purchases

25X1 [redacted] //The Soviets may soon be in the mar-
25X1 ket for additional grain for delivery in the current marketing
year, [redacted]

25X1 [redacted] //We believe that the Soviets have
contracted for 23.5 million tons of grain in 1977, an estimated
22.5 million of which will be delivered in the October 1977 -
September 1978 marketing year. The bulk of the deliveries will
be evenly divided between wheat and corn; there are also small
amounts of barley, rye, and oats.//

25X1 [redacted] //We estimate that the Soviets are
already committed to buy 10 million tons of corn and 5 million
tons of wheat. Because supplies of non-US grain are short, the
Soviets will probably have to make a formal request to the US
to raise the 15-million-ton purchase limit established by the
long-term US-USSR grain agreement if they are to make substan-
tial additional purchases. [redacted]

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CAMBODIA-VIETNAM: Situation Report

25X1 [redacted] Vietnam's public reaction to Cambodia's severing of
diplomatic relations on Saturday has been more of sorrow than
anger. Meanwhile, Vietnamese troops are mopping up Cambodian
units in Svay Rieng Province.

25X1 [redacted] Recalling their common struggle for independence,
Hanoi expressed regret that Cambodia soured the relationship
with armed incursions into Vietnam. Detailing past efforts to
bring the Cambodians to the negotiating table, Hanoi urged an
early meeting to discuss the current situation. Phnom Penh
radio late yesterday broadcast official statements that Cam-
bodia would not consider talks unless Vietnam withdraws its
forces and creates "an atmosphere of friendship and mutual
confidence."

25X1 [redacted] China, although Cambodia's mentor, has taken an im-
partial stance by broadcasting without comment both Cambodian
and Vietnamese statements. Moscow, on the other hand, sharply

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criticized Cambodia's action and supported Vietnam's call for a meeting to settle the dispute. The Soviet response also clearly implied that Peking fully supported Cambodia's action. Initial Soviet reaction ignored Cambodian intimations that Soviet advisers are with Vietnamese forces.

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[] The Vietnamese continue their military operations in the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng but are encountering stiff Cambodian resistance.

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[] Since the Vietnamese invaded Svay Rieng in early December, they have destroyed several Cambodian combat units, captured a large number of Cambodian troops, and now occupy key positions throughout the province. []

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TURKEY: Coalition Government

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[] //President Koruturk on Sunday named opposition leader Bulent Ecevit to form a new coalition government. Prime Minister Demirel, who resigned Saturday when his coalition failed to win a vote of confidence, will remain as caretaker until Ecevit wins acceptance for his cabinet and program, possibly within two weeks.//

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[] //Ecevit's efforts to bring down Demirel and his three-party coalition succeeded Saturday when he mustered 228 votes against the government in a no-confidence motion. Weakened by the defection of 11 Justice Party deputies last October, Demirel's government polled only 218 ballots, eight short of a majority.//

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[] //An informal coalition headed by Ecevit and his Republican People's Party might be able to count upon 227 votes, one more than a majority. Aside from two small splinter parties possessing three votes and his own party's 213, Ecevit has received support from 11 of parliament's 14 independents.//

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25X1 [] //While questions remain about Ecevit's ability to hold his prospective allies together, his success in unseating Demirel will probably strengthen the commitment to forming a stable government. Furthermore, Ecevit's allies might fear that a failure to put together a government could precipitate a political crisis in which the military might intervene--despite the recent statement by the Chief of the General Staff that the military intends to stay out of politics.//

25X1 [] //Ecevit's highly personal approach to politics makes it difficult to predict his actions on foreign and domestic issues. He believes austerity measures are essential if Turkey's serious economic problems are to be solved and will probably accept the International Monetary Fund's conditions for granting a loan in order to reassure other international lenders.//

25X1 [] //Domestic security may prove a more difficult problem for Ecevit to solve. Turks have become accustomed to a high level of political violence, much of which is the work of individuals or small groups acting spontaneously and with little allegiance either to larger organizations or to ideologies. Ecevit, usually cast as a social democrat, might placate leftist elements but incite rightists to more violence.//

25X1 [] //In order to solve Turkey's continuing problems with Cyprus and the Aegean, Ecevit might opt for a dramatic move, such as an immediate meeting with Greece's Prime Minister Karamanlis. On Cyprus, Ecevit would probably be in a better position to make concessions than his predecessor.//

25X1 [] //Nevertheless, the Cyprus situation could well prove less open to compromise than are Turkish claims in the Aegean. The military might quietly press Ecevit to make progress on Cyprus in order to improve chances for US ratification of the \$1 billion Defense Cooperation Agreement, but they too are divided as to how much Turkey should concede. []

CHILE: Plebiscite Consequences

25X1 [] *The Chilean public will respond by plebiscite on Wednesday to President Pinochet's appeal for support in the face of "foreign aggression" on the human rights issue. Despite dissent within the junta, and against the judgment of his civilian supporters, Pinochet is determined to gamble on this "national consultation."*

25X1 [] The consequences of exposing the regime to popular judgment will almost surely exceed what Pinochet had in mind when he submitted his political brainchild. He evidently foresaw an easy personal victory in playing on nationalistic sentiment against foreign criticism. He may also have counted on the pervasive fear that has developed among the public that the military will somehow know how each individual votes.

25X1 [] Pinochet did not anticipate either the immediate or longer range risks in this venture. Unless the vote is overwhelmingly favorable and the election unquestionably clean, the prestige of the regime will suffer and Pinochet's personal chance to enhance the power of the presidency will falter.

25X1 [] Air Force General Leigh still refuses to support the plebiscite. With the junta's division now in the public domain, some shakeup in the governing body will almost certainly be required after the vote is in. No clear mechanism exists to prevent this shakeup from becoming another embarrassing confrontation within the leadership.

25X1 [] A longer range risk arises from Pinochet's implicit acknowledgment that the regime depends on popular support. The plebiscite on Wednesday is likely to create demands for other expressions of popular will. According to the US Embassy, many Chileans believe the plebiscite will have a major impact on the country's future. The junta will not be able to ignore these expectations without further political cost. []

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